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Is Reasonableness an Aim of Early Childhood Education?
A Response to Preschool as a Wellspring of Democracy
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Abstract
Erickson and Thompson articulate and defend reasonableness as an important civic educational aim 
for early childhood education. In this response, I argue that further clarity regarding the nature and 
scope of “reasonableness” as an educational concept is needed. Is such a concept fundamentally polit-
ical, or does it capture a broader notion of educational value? My view is that, from an educational 
point of view, the need for reasonable deliberation in plural societies makes salient that there are cer-
tain situations that mature moral agents should be prepared to handle (i.e., conflict about basic politi-
cal matters). But this is merely part of a broader moral education. I explain why I think this is the case, 
pointing to some sharp differences between the nature of civic deliberation and moral deliberation, 
more broadly.
This article is in response to
Erickson, J. D., Thompson, W. (2019). Preschool as a Wellspring for Democracy: Endorsing Traits of 
Reasonableness in Early Childhood Education. Democracy & Education, 27(1), Article 1.
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Overview
In “Preschool as a Wellspring of Democracy: Endorsing Traits of Reasonableness in Early Childhood Education,” Erickson and Thompson (2019) articulate and defend a 
conception of reasonableness as an educational aim for early 
childhood. They claim that in a liberal democratic society, citizens 
must “sufficiently exhibit traits of reasonableness in their engage-
ment with their fellows” (p. 1). These traits of reasonableness 
“encompass adaptive habits, skills, mind- sets, values, norms, and 
attitudes that guide one’s engagement with other persons as moral 
and political equals in a process of shared political life” (p. 2). 
Reasonableness is used here in the Rawlsian sense, that is, citizens 
motivated, and able, to accept/propose terms of social cooperation 
for the benefit of all (Rawls, 2005). The reasonable citizen, for 
example, is someone who recognizes that their own idea of what is 
good or worthwhile will be different from that of other citizens. 
Accordingly, reasonable citizens understand that some of the 
public policies that they see as obviously beneficial will be unac-
ceptable to others. The reasonable citizen accepts this and sees 
value in political solutions that all similarly reasonable citizens can 
freely accept without intimidation, coercion, or indoctrination.
Being reasonable is normative. It does not develop naturally or 
in the home (Erickson & Thompson, 2019, p. 2). Without 
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educational intervention, we are apt to be bad at being reasonable. 
Unreasonable citizens polarize the political culture of society, 
making it more fragmented and less cooperative. Erickson and 
Thompson (2019) attribute recent legislative failures in the US to 
polarization effects made possible by a deficit in reasonableness 
traits in the public sphere (p. 2). Therefore, the cultivation of 
reasonableness is a public good and a legitimate1 civic educational 
aim. As the authors note, political philosophers have long argued 
the implications of reasonableness for civic education (Brighouse, 
1998; Callan, 1997; De Wijze, 1999). Typically, these arguments 
have focused on civic education in schools. The authors’ novel 
contribution is to argue that reasonableness as a civic education 
goal should be extended to preschool, offering two reasons why 
preschool represents a special opportunity for its cultivation.
The first reason is institutional. Preschool is a significant 
public space for children taking their first, tentative steps away 
from the private sphere of the family (Erickson & Thompson, 2019, 
p. 4). Accordingly, encounters with other children are a powerful 
opportunity to structure a good ‘civic first impression’ in a way that 
makes civic norms of reasonableness explicit. Think, for example, 
of the teacher’s insistence that young children share classroom 
toys. As the authors put it, “[p]reschool civics standards guiding 
classroom dealings . . . do not convey the depth with which we 
believe young children should come to understand rules, such as 
the directive to share, to be justified by an appeal to the common 
good” (Erickson & Thompson, 2019, p. 4). That is to say, educators 
can engage preschool children in pluralistic dialogue— likely 
among their first experiences of public deliberation— in order to 
cultivate the reciprocity deemed essential for civic reasonableness.
The second reason is developmental. According to the 
authors, empirical research suggests that children are naturally 
more open- minded than older children and adults. Their schemas 
are less shaped (or biased) by previous experience, and so they are 
more open to social cooperation. This will “increase the likelihood 
young children will willingly participate in civic- minded explora-
tions and come to value examining their own views in conjunction 
with others, which in turn, could serve them in their future 
political interactions with others” (Erickson & Thompson, 2019, 
p. 5). Young children are impressionable, and educators should 
take advantage of this fact in order to prime them to view social 
cooperation favorably.
1 In the sense that the liberal state has the political authority to pro-
mote reasonableness in public institutions such as schools. Erickson and 
Thompson (2019) address the problem of political neutrality in order to 
address the objection that an education for reasonableness in preschool 
is too politically controversial. I cannot address their argument in full 
here but can point out that while reasonableness may not be politically 
controversial it does not follow that preschooling ought to be a state 
responsibility. The argument that preschools ought to provide civic edu-
cation requires an account of why the preschool is part of the basic struc-
ture of a liberal society and therefore subject to the political authority of 
the state. Without such authority, which would cover the education of all 
young children, we risk a system in which some preschool children have 
the privilege of an education for civic reasonableness and others do not.
Reasonableness and Early Childhood
Should reasonableness be an aim of education in early childhood? 
The promise, as I understand it, is that if reasonableness were an 
expectation from the earliest stages of moral development, citizens 
would internalize traits of reasonableness durable enough to resist 
an increasingly divisive public culture.2 Erickson and Thompson 
(2019) put forward an appealing case for thinking that reasonable-
ness as an aim of education in early childhood may increase 
political stability in the long term. They supplement their case with 
thoughtful pedagogical examples that would be endorsed by most 
any educator committed to the promotion of rationality as an 
educational aim. The preschool is a neglected area of focus for 
normative thinking about education, and the authors do a service 
in directing scholarly attention to important questions regarding 
the moral and political responsibilities of early childhood 
education.
The focus of my response will be on the Rawlsian framework 
that Erickson and Thompson (2019) draw on in order to justify 
pluralistic dialogue in the preschool classroom. While the authors 
make a convincing case that the aims of preschooling need to be 
more carefully theorized, I believe that more needs to be said about 
what makes these aims specifically Rawlsian. The educational value 
of many of the practices that the authors endorse, especially those 
centered on pluralistic dialogue, could just as easily (or perhaps 
even more easily) be captured by other deliberative democratic 
theories (Gutmann, 1999; Habermas, 1990). This does not mean 
that the authors should appeal to these other theories. My point  
is that an account detailing what a specifically Rawlsian account 
reveals about the educational value of preschool deliberation, in 
contrast to other deliberative theories, would provide a stronger 
theoretical and practice rationale to Erickson’s and Thompson’s 
proposed project.
In this spirit, I make two key points. The first point attempts to 
clarify how the educational aim of Rawlsian reasonableness is 
distinctive within a broader picture of preschool moral and civic 
education. My claim here is that, from an educational point of view, 
the need for reasonable deliberation in plural societies makes 
salient certain situations that mature moral agents should be 
prepared to handle (i.e., conflict about basic political matters). 
Preschools have a potentially important role to play in such 
preparation, but this role should be framed within a broader moral 
education. I will do this by pointing to some sharp differences 
between the nature of civic deliberation and moral deliberation. 
My efforts at clarification do not aim to change, substantively, 
anything that Erickson and Thompson (2019) advance in their 
paper so much as sharpen the distinctive value that a Rawlsian 
deliberation brings early childhood education.
My second point focuses on potential challenges facing the 
preschool educator aiming to promote Rawlsian traits of reason-
ableness. Recall that Rawlsian reasonableness is valuable insofar as 
it enables citizens to resolve their disagreements through a 
“freestanding” justification. By this I mean that citizens do not 
2 I leave to the side the question of whether this comes close to civic 
indoctrination, but see Brighouse (1998).
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resolve public moral and political disagreements through appeal to 
what they believe is “true” or “right”; rather, they propose fair terms 
that they anticipate other citizens can accept from the standpoint 
of their own particular conception of the good. This approach to 
political deliberation is sometimes referred to as “epistemic 
abstinence” (Raz, 1990). The authors do not explicitly propose  
that children should be taught to endorse epistemic abstinence  
i.e. that they stop thinking that the claims they make in a pluralistic 
dialogue are potentially “true” or “right.” But given that Erickson 
and Thompson claim that their approach is Rawlsian, and given 
also that the point of Rawlsian reasonableness traits is to prepare 
future citizens to deal with basic moral and political disagreements 
in an epistemically abstentious way, this raises some challenges for 
how the preschool educator should handle the moral or political 
disagreements that are bound to arise in the preschool classroom.
Is Preschool Reasonableness Moral or Civic?
Erickson and Thompson (2019) frame reasonableness as an 
important civic educational goal. They point to gridlock in the 
legislative process as a consequence of an unreasonable political 
culture. Their conjecture is that an emphasis on reasonableness 
early in life will pay dividends for political stability in the long run. 
It is plausible to imagine that if young children internalize traits of 
reasonableness early in life we will get a better political culture in 
return. However, should we think that these political goods reflect 
the reason why early childhood educators should promote traits 
such as perspective- taking and a desire for the common good? It 
seems both more intuitive and more justifiable to view the traits 
preschools ought to instill as part of a broader moral education; one 
that understands political morality as but one part of the reason-
able, appropriately conceived. While I do not think that the authors 
explicitly reject this latter view, and could even accept such a view 
without serious change to their proposal, I believe an account of the 
place of Rawlsian traits of reasonableness within a broader picture 
of moral and civic education could help preschool teachers better 
understand why they should support the promotion of the former.
On the one hand, Erickson and Thompson (2019) claim that 
their concept of reasonableness is intended to be broad, with the 
idea that additional traits of reasonableness could be identified and 
accounted for in further work (p. 2). On the other hand, their 
justification of the reasonable is “in alignment with Rawls” (p. 2). 
People should be reasonable for the reason that they have different 
worldviews, and arriving at an overlapping consensus/common 
good among these different worldviews increases political 
stability.3 Consequently, by them aligning with Rawls, I think that 
3 In various places in the text, Erickson and Thompson (2019) argue 
that reasonable political deliberation should lead to the “common good.” 
Rawls (2005) explicitly states that reasonable deliberators are not moved 
by an interest in the “general good” but in fair terms of social coopera-
tion (p. 50). These fair terms amount to an overlapping consensus in 
which a pluralistic community can endorse the same principles but for 
different reasons. Because the authors are in alignment with Rawls, I take 
them to see “common good” as equivalent to an “overlapping consensus” 
as opposed to a utilitarian “greater good.”
their conception of the reasonable comes across as narrower than 
intended. This, because Rawlsian reasonableness refers to the 
political domain specifically, as opposed to a moral sensibility, 
which can be applied to a number of different domains: political, 
public, private, civic, and so on.
Therefore, the authors could make their case more persuasive 
by being explicit in identifying the distinctive value that a Rawlsian 
framework brings to preschool deliberations apart from other 
educational theories that emphasize the inclusion of a plurality of 
views in public discussion. Without such clarification, the would-
 be educator sympathetic to reasonableness is at risk of going awry. 
Consider the example of children not wanting to share a toy 
(Erickson and Thompson, 2019, p. 4). We could reframe this 
conflict as a political problem in order to promote Rawlsian 
political morality. The “political community” of the classroom has 
a valuable, but scarce, resource (toys). Children are in a conflict 
over who gets to play with that toy and for how long (a distributive 
justice problem). The early childhood educator sees this conflict as 
an opportunity to get children to deliberate about the effects and 
consequences of, say, different distributive approaches. Along the 
way, children exercise competences related to social cooperation. 
Some of them make important cognitive achievements, such as 
realizing that if everyone insisted on what they wanted all the time, 
everyone would be worse off. Eventually, the class arrives at fair 
terms that all can accept: a distributive rule that ensures every child 
has an equal opportunity to play with the toy.
If successful, the teachers will have arguably had a positive 
effect on children “as future political actors” (Erickson & Thomp-
son, 2005, p. 5) in a liberal pluralist democracy. Yet does the 
educational value of these and other laudatory interventions 
depend on the existence of such a political framework? I suspect 
that educators on board with the authors’ proposed interventions 
ought not to see them (exclusively) as Rawlsian, or even political, 
aims. First, the cases the authors use in their examples (toys, 
hatching chicks) may resemble political problems in the abstract, 
but for the people caught up in them (children, teachers), they are 
first and foremost moral problems. By “moral,” I mean inter-
personal conflicts pertaining to how individual actors treat one 
another. In our daily interactions— in the workplace and in the 
home— a moral point of view calls on us to treat each other with 
respect and dignity. The fact that I want something, for example, 
doesn’t make it morally permissible to harm others in order to get 
it. It is morally impermissible to harm others on such grounds, 
even where there are no laws against it or no political authority to 
prevent me from doing so. When educators are working with 
young children, they ought to instill these norms of treatment in 
children irrespective of the political goods that such efforts might 
(or might not) generate in the long run. Or, to put it differently, 
political morality is not the only good served by instilling norms. 
For example, part of what it means for the early childhood educa-
tor to treat children with moral respect is to make sure that 
appropriate norms of moral respect are recognized and followed  
by all.
Second, I suspect that on Rawls’s (2005) own account, 
Rawlsian reasonableness is too narrow as a standalone educational 
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concept for early childhood. Rawls claims that the reasonable is 
that part of a moral conception of the person concerned with  
social cooperation (p. 51). Rawls emphasizes its importance for a 
political conception of the person. The reasonable is connected to  
a sense of political justice but it is not exhausted by a sense of 
political justice. Citizens also live as individuals and in associations 
that are not strictly political. They must be reasonable as is appro-
priate in those apolitical contexts, and more besides. To be sure, 
when the Rawlsian citizen enters into deliberations about basic 
public and political arrangement, they need to be reasonable in the 
narrow sense if we want to successfully “specify the reasons we are 
to share and publicly recognize before one another as grounding 
our social relations” (p. 53). But this is simply the public- facing side 
of a larger moral sensibility that enables us to see other people as 
distinctive centers of value in their own right. This moral sensi-
bility, which includes reasonableness, is logically prior to a political 
conception of the person. Therefore, if all of morality is normative 
(in the sense that we can learn to do it better), and if we ought to 
educate for political morality, it follows that we have reason to 
educate for morality full stop.
This is all to say that what we take “reasonableness” to mean in 
the educational domain will make a practical difference for the 
early childhood educator. I argue that we should want preschool 
educators to understand reasonableness in the broader sense. In 
the political sphere, we call on reasonableness in order to propose 
cooperative principles and policies governing basic matters of 
justice and fairness. However, while this aspect of civic life is 
important, it makes for a relatively small dimension of our moral 
experience. Reasonableness, for example, also applies to public 
morality— to those person- to- person situations when we are called 
on to treat others (and ourselves) with moral respect despite 
disagreement or conflict. Accordingly, the reasons that educators 
have (and the reasons they should give to their students) for 
promoting reasonableness traits are not limited to the idea that, by 
acquiring such traits, children will be better citizens— better public 
reasoners— in the future. Rather, children should acquire an 
understanding of what it means to treat other persons as persons.4
Reasonableness understood as a broad moral power that 
informs political morality expands the range of situations that the 
early childhood educator can recognize as opportunities for 
fostering traits of reasonableness. It also expands what counts as a 
reasonableness trait. Consider the child who makes a lying promise 
to another student in order to get the toy (“I will give it back in just 
a minute”). Lying does not appear to fall under the kind of situa-
tions that the authors have in mind. There is no encounter with 
“rational views dissimilar from one’s own” (Erickson & Thompson, 
2019, p. 2) nor a plurality of interests that require accommodation. 
Nor is there a burden of judgement in play: any reasonable person 
would think the lie was wrong. Nonetheless, many of the educa-
tional interventions that the authors recommend in their paper 
4 Note that another positive feature of the broader approach is that the 
justification of structured deliberation does not depend on the empirical 
claim that it will make young children reasonable citizens in the  
long run.
would be welcome in this case. The educator would be well advised 
to do more than simply direct the child not to lie or manipulate 
others. They could take the conflict as an opportunity to encourage 
the class to deliberate on the reasons why it is wrong to lie and if 
there are ever circumstances where lying is appropriate, and so on. 
They could encourage children to share what it feels like to be lied 
to. Reason- giving, moral sensitivity, and perspective- taking: all are 
candidate traits of reasonableness under this broader conception. 
They may not translate fully into the context of political morality, 
but they more fully capture what it means to educate for reasonable 
persons.
Am I arguing that we should just drop Rawlsian reasonable-
ness and focus on the moral? On the contrary, setting out this 
broader context prepares the way for a distinctive argument for 
why Rawlsian traits of reasonableness matter. I suspect that there 
are several candidate reasons. But here is one: Learning how to 
show respect for persons when it comes to noncontroversial 
matters such as sharing a favorite toy can be motivationally 
challenging for children. Epistemically speaking, it’s not too hard 
to recognize what the right thing to do involves. Children often 
know that they ought to share, they just don’t want to. Learning 
how to show respect for other persons in a diverse society, however, 
is a more complex matter. Part of what it means to be a moral agent 
in a diverse society is to realize that other moral agents should be 
free to disagree with us on things we care deeply about. This means 
that, especially in pluralistic situations where there may be little 
common ground, we should strive to keep cooperating. One way to 
do this is to promote an early awareness of just how diverse in its 
moral perspectives a flourishing democratic society can be. Not 
every moral conflict in the classroom needs to be framed in this 
way, but there will surely be some that fit the bill. An awareness of 
moral diversity (or “the fact of pluralism/fact of disagreement”) 
and other Rawlsian reasonableness traits like it are potentially key 
to the overall moral preparation of person’s living in a democratic 
community.
Reasonableness and Epistemic Abstinence
I claimed that one reason why reasonableness is a distinctively 
valuable educational aim is because engaging in respectful debate 
with other citizens in a plural society can be epistemically chal-
lenging. One way to get around the challenge recommended by a 
Rawlsian approach— to deflate the deliberative tensions, as it 
were— is to stop thinking about deliberation as a search for the 
“right” or “true” answer in the first place.
This is where political reasonableness really comes in.  
The reasonable citizen values, for its own sake, a society in which 
all can benefit. Nonetheless, there is an important difference 
between a reasonable political agent and a reasonable moral one. 
The reasonable political agent will propose that we allocate 
playtime in accordance with principle X because they anticipate 
that others (themselves included) will be able to endorse that 
allocation even if everyone’s reasons for agreeing to that 
principle are different (for example, some agents want equal time 
because they were taught at home that equality matters, while some 
agents want equal time because they know that if they can’t get to 
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an agreement otherwise, they are likely to get no playtime, while 
others simply value equality for its own sake). This is what makes 
political principles “freestanding” for Rawls. Political justification 
aims to be “reasonable,” not “right” or “correct.” This is sometimes 
called an “epistemic abstinence” account of public deliberation 
(Raz, 1990). The reasonable moral agent will propose that we 
allocate playtime in accordance with principle X because they 
believe that they can justify that allocation to all others in terms of 
shared reasons that all could recognize and accept. Maybe they are 
mistaken in their belief. Regardless, they are committed to finding 
an action/policy/principle that can be justified to everyone. That is 
to say, they believe that their moral judgement has validity and that 
through reasoned discourse with others, they can redeem that 
validity.
While the difference is philosophically subtle, the moral 
psychology involved is quite different. In the political mode, I 
check what I believe to be true or right, and I instead propose/
endorse principles that I anticipate others (myself included) will 
also endorse. While I may think these principles are false, I view 
them as reasonable because they can win the support of others 
based on their own private reasons, my own included (Rawls, 2005, 
p. 143). In the moral mode, meanwhile, I believe the principle to be 
justifiable, and I’m willing to test out that belief, submitting it to 
critical scrutiny by diverse others.
To be sure, children should be prepared to occasionally 
bracket what they believe to be true, good, or right in plural 
contexts. This is desirable both as a political and a personal trait. 
But I think that it would be a mistake to leave children with the 
impression that all political conflicts can or should be solved via 
social cooperation. As moral agents, we have an intuitive sense that 
our actions should be justifiable to an audience of our peers— that 
we act on reasons that all others in a relevantly similar situation 
could accept, or at the least not reasonably reject (Habermas, 1990; 
Scanlon, 1998). Learning about the justifiability of our actions 
requires opportunities for epistemic deliberation with others— a 
search for truth or rightness. The epistemically abstentious 
political morality that the early childhood educator is being asked 
to aim for is based on an institutional separation between a citizen’s 
personally held views on the good life and the public sphere 
(Habermas, 2006). It is an institutional separation that mature 
moral agents need to be aware of when they engage in public 
reason in spaces such as the courts. But we ought to be careful not 
to institutionalize the developing child’s moral conscience. The 
question that needs to be carefully considered is how appropriate it 
is, developmentally speaking, to teach young children to view 
epistemic abstinence as a basic feature of their moral reasoning.5
5 “The liberal state must not transform the requisite institutional sepa-
ration of religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological 
burden for those of its citizens who follow a faith. It must of course 
expect of them that they recognize the principle that political authority is 
exercised with neutrality towards competing world views. Every citizen 
must know and accept that only secular reasons count beyond the insti-
tutional threshold that divides the informal public sphere from parlia-
ments, courts, ministries and administrations” (Habermas, 2006, p. 11).
One might argue that the early childhood educator is in no 
danger of doing anything like this. We are simply asking that they 
encourage children to appreciate how people from different 
backgrounds and experiences will view political issues such as 
immigration and gender representation differently. But if the 
educator is supposed to be aiming for genuinely Rawlsian traits  
of reasonableness it is not enough that children be exposed to, and 
learn to appreciate, different points of view. There is a plethora of 
deliberative theories that would endorse the same practices. 
Success in preparing children for life as reasonable Rawlsian 
citizens means future citizens who practice epistemic abstinence.
One could again stress that all we are asking the preschool 
educator to do is foster traits of reasonableness in a very basic 
sense. It does not require them to get into thorny questions about 
the epistemic nature and limits of public justification. As the 
authors are careful to point out, after all, their examples “showcase 
an awareness of moral complexity and epistemic humility (for-
warded as potential, but not here defended as necessary, traits of 
reasonableness) in developmentally appropriate ways” (Erickson & 
Thompson, 2019, p. 8, emphasis mine). However, given that the 
preschool educator will be engaging with children on political 
issues, they are likely to encounter situations where children are 
sincerely giving the best epistemic reasons they have for their 
moral and political beliefs. These reasons may be received as plain 
wrong by other students (perhaps such reasons come across as 
offensive or controversial). It isn’t clear to me what the preschool 
educator aiming for Rawlsian reasonableness should do in such 
situations. Encouraging the classroom to critically assess contro-
versial reasons as a deliberative community seems to be too 
epistemic a way of framing deliberation to pay the political 
dividends the authors want. But encouraging children to bracket 
the concept of truth or rightness and aim for social cooperation 
seems to introduce the very institutionalization of moral con-
sciousness that I’m concerned about. My view is that the epistemic 
route is the right way to go (Martin, 2018). But if not, a specifically 
Rawlsian conception of reasonableness requires saying more about 
the extent to which, and the ways in which, epistemic abstinence is 
developmentally appropriate (or not) in the preschool classroom.
Conclusion
I want to underscore that my points are aimed at further clarity and 
elaboration, motivated by a promising project. Erickson’s & 
Thompson’s paper is to be lauded for the moral seriousness it 
accords to both young children and the professionals responsible 
for their care. My modest suggestion is that a more detailed 
account of reasonableness as an educational concept will make this 
proposal both more convincing to, and more helpful as a guide for, 
the early childhood educator.
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